Friday, February 25, 2022

The Netflix Story in 2022

Netflix's revenues grew 19% in 2021, but has its grip on the top spot in the entertainment-streaming market loosened? Is the company now less burdened by debt (now at $15 billion)?

By all standards, Netflix is a household name, a brand known to the population around the world. Company strategy has pushed its streaming services to every corner of the globe. The model has been successful, and the stay-at-home days of the pandemic helped spur subscriptions.

The company recently announced 2021 results, and headlines splashed across the financial media about its praiseworthy 19% growth in revenues ($29.7 billion in total)--aided continually by pandemic-era demand for streaming services and the steady upbeat in subscriptions in global markets. (Subscriptions now exceed 220 million.)

Stock investors didn't celebrate too much, as its share price has slid down a roller coaster in recent weeks. But does that reflect investors' concerns about the Netflix momentum easing up, or did that reflect traders expressing a greater concern about equity valuations everywhere?

In many ways, Netflix once again is at a pivotal point, a junction. The revenue growth rate is its lowest reported in the past nine years, the lowest since it long ago veered away from DVDs in the mail and hammered out its streaming strategy. 

The alarm among investors or debt analysts has not always been a slowdown in growth. The company generated $5 billion in earnings and enough cash flow to ease some of the concerns about its mounting debt.  Netflix's story, at least among debt-holders and ratings agencies, had been its steady habit of tapping debt markets to support the development of new content. New content, subscribers know well, is necessary to feed the growth and at least maintain a tight grip on old subscribers. 

New content (programs, movies, documentaries, etc.) helps it maintain the old accounts, but permits it to attract new subscribers in the U.S. and regions and cultures around the world. But new content must be financed. Over the past eight years, the company's financial managers funded over $25 billion in new content (production costs, talent and acquisition costs, etc.) mostly from long-term debt (now hovering about $15 billion). 

It has shirked issuing new equity to accomplish the same. Contrast with Tesla--although in a different industry, which issued $20 billion in new stock in 2020 to support its aggressive strategy to construct the infrastructure and production lines to manufacture more electric vehicles. (Netflix doesn't pay a dividend and hasn't hinted at doing so yet.)

At Netflix for years, because there had been earnings, there has been operating cash flow, but not enough to support all of its new-content goals. And after the stock markets helped spark a surge in its share price, the company has been reluctant to issue new equity to support such growth--the better to not dilute share value. 

Furthermore, during a near-euphoria period of low interest rates and enthusiastic debt markets, the company had little trouble finding willing institutions, investors and banks to provide funds. Ratings agencies assigned non-investment-grade ratings to Netflix bonds, but investors snapped up the issues and traded them as if they were investment-grade.

Over the past two years, the steady increase in earnings (and operating cash flow) has permitted the company to slow down adding more debt. The boost in cash flows led one rating agency to upgrade the company to a BBB rating in 2021.

Netflix is now producing new content at a rate of  at least $5 billion annually, an amount it likely has determined is necessary to keep subscriptions growing. By 2021, the company announced and then proved it could fund much of the new development mostly from operating cash flow. 

Yet debt still has to be managed, refinanced, or paid down. There is still the $15 billion it must address, when some of that matures in years to come. The company will likely seek to refinance whatever might be due during that time. 

Debt levels are often measured by the common Debt/EBITDA ratio--which has fallen from above 7.0 down to about 2.4 today. EBITDA, a performan metric based on pre-tax earnings, doesn't account for cash required to support new content. After accounting for new-content expenditures, there isn't much cash remaining (even in 2021) to pay down debt. Hence, the company will continue to rely on debt markets refinancing whatever is due in upcoming years. 

The biggest worry--a concern expressed by stock markets the past month--is whether it revenue growth rate can reach what it experienced the past eight years (an average 27%/year)--especially as every other entertainment enterprise under sun has entered the streaming industry.  They have offered every attraction or pricing discount to streer subscribers away from Netflix. The wars began a few years ago, but haven't peaked. 

Its business model comes down to subscription memberships, retentions and additions. Sounds simple, but many of its strategies, financial planning, and growth prospects revolve around that basic mission: How does Netflix gain subscriptions, keep them, and grow them?

Think about the typical subscriber today--who may be a milennial perched on a sofa in Northern California or a retired baby-boomer in North Carolina or, more and more, a resident of Brazil in search of a diversion. The subscriber today is a sophisticated consumer, who performs scientific-like analysis to figure out the right price to pay for a monthly subscription, a critical factor in this industry, a crucial factor the company faces as it confronts competition and stagnant growth.

Now think about the competition (Disney and Amazon always come to mind), which also has developed sophisticated algorithms to determine correct pricing and gauge what subscribers want to watch.  Inevitably, the solution Netflix has adopted is to increase that subscriber base by developing attractive, alluring content at a pace of about $5 billion annually--while daring to increase monthly prices.  It expects its entertainment specialists will know better than Disney what subscribers want to see, spending as much as possible to ensure high quality.

Proclaiming the necessary and requirement to develop new content is one thing. Another factor is deciding what kind of content to develop for an audience in every region in the world with disparate, local tastes. Arthouse movies? Bollywood? Korean film? Sci-fi? What do subscribers in India prefer to see vs. what subscribers in Argentina or Korea want to see?

CoViD propelled subscription growth in 2020, but CoViD worries curtailed production. Who could make movies when the world was on lockdown? Content spending fell 84% from $5 billion-plus to less than $1 billion. Otherwise, the company would have been making movies if it could have. 

After 2020, the company resumed development back above $5 billion, all while ratings agencies and debt investors have watched the mountainous level of debt. Netflix promised cash flows would catch up and become the primary source of funding. And they have. Sort of. 

Operating cash flow, now above $6 billion, can finance new content. But can that amount continue to grow or at least be generated consistently. The company is no longer the "only game in town." 

The company will not likely reduce debt substantially (by, say, a half), because (a) it won't be able to do so, (b) it may not need to do so now since much of it is due years from now, and (c) investors and lenders will be comfortable with debt at a now-constant level, an amount that can likely be refinanced years from now when due.

On the other hand, as interest rates creep upwards, company finance managers may consider reducing some debt to manage interest payments--which topped $750 million last year and could rise even more as rates rise.

Disney, Hulu, Amazon, Peacock (with the "+" appended to many of their names) and a list as long as high as the moon are now streaming and threatening the company's stronghold on the market. In recent days, even ViacomCBS decided to change its name to Paramount, partly to emphasize its newly adopted streaming strategies.  

That might be the major factor causing 2022's share-price plunge. Its value had approached $700/share in late 2021 and has not dipped by almost a half (down below $370/share), partly because of investors' wariness in the company repeating past growth rates, partly because of the current global sell-off in equity markets. Debt investors and ratings agencies today assess the operating cash flows are in better shape. Equity investors, at least this quarter, assess the 24% annual growth in revenues might be a thing of the past. 

 Tracy Williams

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